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Abstract. We examine the possibility of shift ing the concept of choice to the centre of 
the semiotic theory of learning. Th us, we defi ne sign process (meaning-making) through 
the concept of choice: semiosis is the process of making choices between simultaneously 
provided options. We defi ne semiotic learning as leaving traces by choices, while these 
traces infl uence further choices. We term such traces of choices memory. Further 
modifi cation of these traces (constraints) will be called habituation. Organic needs 
are homeostatic mechanisms coupled with choice-making. Needs and habits result in 
motivatedness. Semiosis as choice-making can be seen as a complementary description 
of the Peircean triadic model of semiosis; however, this can fi t also the models of 
meaning-making worked out in other shools of semiotics. We also provide a sketch for 
a joint typology of semiosis and learning. 
Keywords: biosemiotics; decision-making; free choice; general semiotics; homeostasis; 
need; non-algorithmicity; nowness; post-Darwinism; semiotic quanta; sign typology; 
types of learning
Der Lebensvorgang ist nicht eine Sukzession von 
Ursache und Wirkung, sondern eine Entscheidung.1
Viktor von Weizsäcker (1940: 126)
It would be foolish to claim that one can tackle this 
topic and expect to be satisfi ed.
Francisco Varela (1999: 266)
1 A possible translation could be: “Life is not a sequence of cause and eff ect, but choice”.
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Th e aim of this study is to clarify the relationship between semiosis and learning, 
and also the mutual relatedness of types of semiosis and types of learning. For this 
purpose, we need a general model that would describe the overlapping features of 
learning and semiosis, including the primary forms of these processes. 
Th e model we propose consists in a slight redefi nition of the general terms of 
learning, memory and semiosis. We defi ne these terms bringing in the concept of 
free choice, which has been downplayed by both the computational and the neo-
Darwinian approaches to learning. We observe that, in semiotics, the concept of 
free choice has not received the attention it deserves. 
In the computational approach, learning is commonly modelled as an eff ect in 
certain networks of logic gates (formal neural networks). Since the work of logic 
gates is algorithmically deterministic it implies that free choice, which assumes 
an absence of algorithm at some moments of behaviour, would require a model 
capable of describing free choice as a non-algorithmic event. (We fi nd the latter 
possible via the introduction of the dimension of nowness.)
In neo-Darwinian general biology, which explains the features of organisms 
on the basis of natural selection, the causal (to some extent free and creative) role 
of organism has not been in focus. As Randolf Menzel (2003: 59) describes this, 
“the basic concept of modern biology is that the relationship between phylogenetic 
and individual memory is a one-way road from the phylogenetic to the individual 
memory and not vice-versa”. This does not mean that the neo-Darwinian 
framework completely denies organisms’ choices; it simply derives the choices 
from natural selection, natural selection is seen as responsible for choices made by 
organisms (as, for instance, in Okasha 2018); instead of studying the phenomenon 
of choice itself, attention moved to the predictability of decision-making (Glimcher 
2002)2; some neo-Darwinian accounts derive even human decision-making from 
evolutionary fi tness (e.g., Kenrick et al. 2009). 
Contrariwise, an approach that has sometimes been called the post-Darwinian 
paradigm, emphasizes the fundamental role of organisms as agents and turns 
attention to the choices organisms make (Noble, Noble 2018). According to post-
Darwinian theory, organisms’ choices can make evolution directional. Instead of 
stating that “learning is evolutionarily prepared”3, it would state that evolution is 
prepared by learning. “Diving deeper into the early forms of adaptive behavior”, 
Menzel (2003: 60) adds, we can see that “unicellular organisms like bacteria [...], 
2 Predictability of decisions is also the main interest in economic analysis of (human) 
consumer choice – which is one of most active areas of choice research today (see, for instance, 
Hess, Daly 2014).
3 Th is clearly neo-Darwinian statement comes from Peter Hammerstein and Jeff rey R. 
Stevens (2012: 7).
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algae and ciliates adapt their metabolic machinery and, in the case of ciliates, their 
motor behavior, to changing environmental demands and pass such adaptations to 
successive generations via cytoplasm transmission when their cell bodies divide”. 
Choice can be a source of evolutionary innovation. 
Th e roots of the post-Darwinian paradigm go back at least to the concept of 
organic selection, which is opposed to natural selection, as defi ned by James 
Mark Baldwin. Namely, organic selection can be interpreted as pointing out the 
role of organisms’ free choice. Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1896) had similar ideas.4 
Charles Sanders Peirce, when writing on agapastic evolution, ascribed creativity 
to organisms. Later, Jean Piaget emphasized the role of organisms’ choices (see 
also Scarfe 2018). Lynn Margulis states similarly: “[O]rganisms choose” (Margulis, 
Sagan 1995: 222). Also, for instance, Ben Williams (1994: 84) writes:
As argued by Herrnstein (1970), all behavior is choice, in the sense that there are 
always alternatives other than the response measured by the experimenter. Th us, 
the animal is always “deciding” which response to perform. 
Th us the idea that organisms make choices is not new. John Zachary Young (1987: 
148) mentions: “Th e realization that choice is a property of all living things gives 
us great help in understanding the world and our place in it”. Th e idea that theories 
of choice and of learning can be jointly approached on the basis of semiotics, has 
also been suggested earlier (Stables, Gough 2006). What has not been so oft en 
formulated, however, is the identifi cation of choice-making with semiosis. With 
this, we develop here our earlier work on the role of choice in semiosis (Kull 2015b, 
2017, 2018).
1. The sketch of the basic model
By ‘semiosis’ we mean the process of choice-making between simultaneously 
alternative options. 
We defi ne ‘semiotic learning’ as the leaving behind of such traces by choices, 
which could influence further choices. These traces of choices will be called 
‘memory’. Further modifi cation of traces from learning will be called ‘habituation’. 
Organisms’ needs stem from mechanisms of homeostasis which are coupled 
with the capacity of making choices. Needs and habits are the sources of 
motivatedness.
4 He also provides a criterion for choice: “an alteration or modifi cation of response in the 
light of individual experience” (Morgan 1896: 265). 
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2. Comments on the basic model
Th ese defi nitions may need some comments, since they are very brief and very 
general and do not explicitly follow the classic defi nitions in semiotics or related 
areas in biology, psychology or education research. 
2.1. Semiosis as choosing
Semiosis is the process in which the sign (and meaning) emerges. In other terms, 
semiosis is interpretation, the formation of interpretant – according to Peirce. 
Yet it is important to emphasize that interpretation always includes choice (as 
also noted by Umberto Eco; e.g., in Eco 2018: 346–347). Processes without choice 
would be algorithmic transformations, or simply codes. In this sense, codes are 
both products and preconditions of semiosis, not semiosis itself. Meaning exists 
only within interpretation processes.
Th us we describe semiosis as decision-making in an ambiguous situation. 
We see this as a complementary description of the Peircean triadic model of 
semiosis. Th e aspects in the choice process that correspond to the three relata can 
be described as follows. Representamen by itself is ambiguous, as it is possible to 
interpret it in various ways. Th is means that representamen may refer to diff erent 
objects. In semiosis, a choice is made between these possibilities, which appear as 
options, and representamen becomes related to a particular object. Th is relation is a 
decision, which is the same as interpretant. Representamen, object and interpretant 
emerge together at the event of choice-making. In this stands the irreducibility of 
the triad, which Peirce described. 
According to this description, semiosis supposes a choice between options. A 
peculiarity of semiosis consists in its momentariness and presentness. Because 
optionality requires the simultaneous presence (co-presence) of possibilities, the 
existence of choice implies the existence of fi nite present, the nowness. Accordingly, 
semiosis, while being a process for an external observer, is what happens within 
one subjective moment of the agent. Th is is also why semiotics is incompatible with 
a physicalist concept of time, and with physicalism altogether – “there is no present 
or nowness in fundamental physical theories” (Franck, Atmanspacher 2009: 212). 
Since the fi nite present is a fundamental and universal feature of subjectivity, it 
follows that free choice, semiosis, and subjectivity are coextensive. Th e present 
moment is the quantum of semiosis. Semiosis stops time – in the sense that the 
Now emerges in semiosis. Semiosis is choice-making. 
Th us the defi nition of semiosis through choice can be seen as equivalent to the 
defi nition of semiosis as an irreducible triadic relation in the Peircean tradition. 
In case of elementary semiosis, representamen, object and interpretant are not 
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temporally separated. Th is is precisely why semiotics is a study of the mind – since 
mind assumes nowness. Moreover, with a focus on time, biosemiotics can bridge 
the inside and outside perspectives. Franck and Atmanspacher (2009: 212) write: 
As an alternative to dual-aspect or dual-perspective [fi rst-person and third-
person] accounts, it has occasionally been proposed to translate the mind-matter 
distinction into terms of time [...]: mental presence is addressed in terms of 
mental time while material reality is addressed by physical time. We consider this 
proposal as particularly promising because time plays a substantial role in both 
the mental and the material domain, yet this role shows characteristic diff erences 
in the two domains. 
Th e possibilities (options) to be chosen in semiosis are themselves habits (or codes) 
that appear as occasionally incompatible (or in confl ict) – they are alternatives. 
Th ese habits bring the past to the present and work as anticipations.
2.2. An example of semiosis: Visual-saccadic decision-making
As an example of semiosis, we suggest here a semiotic interpretation of visual-
saccadic decision-making (for a physiological description of this process, see, e.g., 
Glimcher 2001; analogical examples are provided in Cheville 2008). 
For an organism with movable eyes, if there is enough light, the visual fi eld 
provides a simultaneously existing patterned diversity. It consists of potential 
loci to focus on. A functional system that includes light receptors, neural cells and 
muscles, makes an involuntary decision and turns the eye – it makes a quick saccadic 
movement. With this decision as interpretant, the choice is made between many 
options of potential focus. Th us, a visual fi eld pattern as representamen is interpreted 
and an image element as object is created. What is important in our context is that 
(a) the choice can be involuntary and unconscious, and (b) the choice of sight takes 
place within one subjective moment in which the possibilities are simultaneous. 
According to the description of the dual premotor systems model of animal 
choice-making by Goldberg (1992), we can identify the conflicting options 
as premotor systems. In a more general case, there can be many options, two 
characterizing just a minimal system.
2.3. Semiotic learning
Th e interpretant is a decision in the momentary event of choice-making. If the 
decision leaves some traces which could infl uence further choices (in an analogical 
situation), then this is what we call learning, and this corresponds well to what is 
commonly called learning. 
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Making a particular decision means relating – making a relation, making a 
particular representamen-object connection. Th is is a connection that is made. 
Madeness is characteristic of all sign-relations. Sign-relations are made in the sense 
that learning is making a new connection between something that would probably 
not be connected by spontaneous physico-chemical processes, and which solves 
the situation of incompatibility or confusion, the situation of indeterminacy due 
to optionality. 
Learning is the process of building and of modifying memory. Learning is of 
several types, depending on the type of connections made. We describe the types 
of semiotic learning in Section 3 below. 
Semiotic learning is diff erent from algorithmic learning.5 Semiotic learning 
can be defined as establishing a sign relation (or code) in result of choices. 
Algorithmic learning may establish codes without choice, without semiosis.
Thus computational and semiotic descriptions of learning diverge. The 
computational learning (or algorithmic, or formal learning) can be defi ned as based 
on a complex of logic gates that change or modify a classifi cation using certain 
criteria. According to the computational approach, the selection of behavioural 
paths is described via sequential operations, such as IF x THEN y ELSE z. Here, 
neither y and z, nor x and non-x, are true options, for they can be handled 
sequentially and thus cannot build behavioural indeterminacy. By behavioural 
indeterminacy we mean the “don’t-know-what-to-do” situation provided by 
multiple options, by incompatibility of algorithms or confl icting instructions that 
are simultaneously applicable and requiring making choices. 
Th e semiotic concept of learning describes learning as a process that starts with 
behavioural indeterminacy (describable also as a situation of incompatibility, 
confusion, logical confl ict, problem-situation, ambiguity). Th is is a situation in 
which there are options to choose from. Options require simultaneity. Only the 
possibilities that are inseparable in time can be seen as options for a living system. 
Optionality requires nowness, the specious present (Varela 1999; Kull 2015a). Th e 
situation of incompatibility is to be solved via choice.6 Aft er making a choice, 
it may be followed by habituation. For semiotic learning additional criteria are 
not required, as the confl ict itself is its cause. Th us, the semiotic concept is more 
general than the computational concept.
5 On semiotic learning, see also Olteanu 2018 and other contributors in Stables et al. 2018.
6 We see the operation of choice as the simplest operation that is logical and not causal (in 
the sense of causa effi  ciens) – simpler than negation, and, accordingly, prelinguistic and pre-
human.
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Semiotic learning or establishing a new sign relation is possible only due to the 
specious or phenomenal present and optionality. Once the relation is established, 
then the habituated relation (also a code) can work without the phenomenal 
present, in lack of options, i.e., computationally. Th e latter also occurs where a 
semiotic relation can occur without life (e.g., in artefacts).
2.4. Memory, memorizing
What allows a decision being similarly repeated is the traces of the earlier 
decisions, which can be described either as connections established and further 
used in a similar situation, or as a set of constraints that canalizes and restricts 
future choices. 
Th e established connections or constraints (thus, memory) are, primarily, of 
two types:
(A) non-restorable connections; these can serve as temporary memory;
(B) restorable or reproducible connections; these are the basis for lasting memory.
Restorability requires the existence of a mechanism that copies the connection 
so that it can persist despite local destruction of the connection. Restorable 
connection, therefore, means inheritance, and this can be of several types, 
including (a) restorability based on rereading a fi xed pattern, such as a site of DNA 
or RNA, and (b) restorability based on a separate homeostatic cycle.
Note that according to this defi nition of memory, the location of memory can 
be distributed. Memory is not limited to the body of an organism. Traces in the 
surrounding, constructed niche, can be a part of memory. 
2.5. Motivatedness and predictability
Th at the decisions can be predictable to a certain extent is an obvious consequence 
of memory and habituation. Predictability of decision does not contradict with the 
existence of free choice. 
Choice or decision can always be motivated to some extent. However, in order 
for someone to have a choice, some freedom of choosing has to be assumed. 
Th erefore, free choice and motivatedness do not exclude each other; rather, they 
are aspects of the same phenomenon. 
An obvious reason for mistakenly contrasting predictability and choice is the 
common assumption that cause and eff ect are to be always separated in (non-
relativistic) physical, i.e, sequential, time. However, in case of accepting the reality 
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of subjective present, the cause and eff ect can occur non-sequentially. Th e latter is 
a form of semiotic causation (Hoff meyer 2007).7
Anticipation, according to our model, is nothing else than motivatedness or 
preference, based on the constraints established or modifi ed in learning. Th us, 
aff ordance is also a result of earlier traces of choices that reappear during the 
recognition event. 
2.6. Habit, homeostasis, and semiosis
Habituation is generally a fi ne-tuning of the connection made by learning. Th is 
occurs in repeated use of the same, or nearly the same, sign or choice-making. 
It means that when choosing, the same connection is found as in some earlier 
choices, thus the choice does not make a new connection, but it repeats already 
existing ones, still possibly deepening traces or slightly shifting constraints. 
Repeated decision usually strengthens the connection and causes further choices 
in an analogical situation to be more automatic. However, on certain occasions, if 
the diff erence is greater, a habit may reverse, and sensitization takes place.
Th e development of habit towards the automatization of a particular beha-
vioural act may lead to the complete disappearance of the habit’s connection to 
choice. In the latter case, relearning is not possible any more. Habit has turned into 
a mechanical code.
Habit is also a basis for motivatedness, as was explained in Section 2.5 above. 
But motivatedness may result not only from habit, but also from the needs of the 
organism. Th e concept of need is a diffi  cult one for biology, and seldom used as 
a defi ned term in models of organisms, even though the importance of needs as 
behavioural drives is evident. Th e concept of choice may be helpful in defi ning 
need. 
We can observe that basic needs (e.g., for nutrients, sources of energy, warmth, 
etc.) are related to homeostatic mechanisms. Homeostatic mechanisms are usually 
described as mechanical feedback cycles, without a notable diff erence between 
living and non-living systems. Th us, the way which enables the maintenance of 
homeostasis is seen as deterministic. However, the point is that in more complex 
systems (with multiple receptors and ways of action) the search for establishing 
homeostasis may include choice, as far as it can face optionality. Th e functional 
7 “[...] semiotic controls may be distinguished from ordinary deterministic control mecha-
nisms through an inbuilt anticipatory capacity based on a distinct kind of causation that I 
call here “semiotic causation” to denote the bringing about of changes under the guidance of 
interpretation in a local context” (Hoff meyer 2007: 149; my emphasis, K. K.).
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circle, as assumed by Uexküll, includes options. Th us, we can defi ne an organic 
need as homeostasis with choice, which is semiosis. In this manner, both habit 
with choice and homeostasis with choice are cases of semiosis. 
For instance, breathing is a part of the homeostatic mechanism that keeps the 
partial pressures of oxygen and carbon dioxide in blood close to constant. It works 
almost automatically as a habit. Nevertheless, at least in critical situations there is 
choice at work – for instance, when choosing whether to increase the frequency of 
breathing or to move to another place of better air. Th is means there is still some 
possibility for learning to breath diff erently. As Samuel Butler noticed in his book 
Life and Habit, “a child breathes automatically, because it has learnt to breathe little 
by little” (Butler 1878: 243).
2.7. Adjustment
Adaptation-like transformations include processes of a very diverse nature. Besides 
evolutionary adaptation by natural selection, we mentioned two kinds of learning 
– semiotic and computational. Th ere can also be adjustment without learning. 
Th is is a transformation due to various self-organization processes and feedback 
mechanisms. It includes elastic and plastic deformations of materials, in the sense 
of the terms as used in physics. Adjustment is what is going on in ordinary work 
of negative feedback cycles that are not coupled with choice-making. Adjustment 
may remove deviations without any choice-including measurement (measurement 
understood as an epistemic, i.e. semiotic, process). 
What is called plastic change in contemporary biology (West-Eberhard 2003) is 
most oft en (but not always) this kind of adjustment. Plastic changes of organisms 
can occur both without semiotic learning or with semiotic learning involved.
3. A joint typology of semiosis and learning 
In contemporary semiotics, the most frequently used typology of semiosis follows 
a simplifi ed version of Peirce’s typology of signs. Nevertheless, the identifi cation 
of particular types of signs in concrete model situations oft en causes unresolvable 
debates, because the necessary and suffi  cient conditions in this typology are usually 
not explicitly formulated. Connecting the types of semiosis with types of learning 
could (at least to some extent) solve this ambiguity. 
Th e typologies of forms of learning, however, are even more diverse. Th ere 
are many types distinguished and several classifi cations provided. Bruce Moore 
(Moore 2004) lists nearly one hundred forms of learning (see also Kull 2018). 
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Th e following typology of learning (from Holley 2017: 811) is used rather 
widely:
(a) nonassociative learning is a behavioural change brought on by repeated 
presentation of one stimulus with no associated stimulus or event (such as 
reward or punishment); [one form of it is] 
– habituation;





We follow here this typology and its terminology. 
We assume that a choice that leaves some trace is always (some type of) 
associative learning. If traces (i.e., memory) strongly constrain or canalize 
behaviour in certain situations, then the behaviour is called ‘habit’. Th us, habit can 
be modifi ed by repetition, without new connections made along with the choice. 
It is in this sense that habituation is non-associative. Moreover, the canalization 
may be so strong that the behaviour will lose its phase of choice-making and turn 
into an algorithm-based behaviour. 
Th e typology we are going to sketch is based on the relative complexity of 
choice made in semiosis within one moment. Choice means picking an option. 
Th e complexity of diff erent options may vary. If a choice leaves traces, then it 
becomes memorized, thus learnt. Since each choice is a movement, the traces it 
leaves are constraints for movement. Th e complexity of a choice is correlated with 
the complexity of traces it leaves. Th erefore, memory can direct the making of a 
particular type of choice. 
Th e fourfold typology of choice-making that roughly corresponds to the types 
of learning (imprinting, conditioning, imitation, instruction) as above, is the 
following.
(1) Picking a “point” as one of options. Th is is imprinting. It is the simplest form of 
choice, since it does not assume any additional reasoning during the making 
of the choice. What is chosen turns itself to be the object. Th is is an iconic 
relation. 
(2) Picking two “points” that are co-present. Th is is association in a narrow sense. 
Th is includes a fi rst, and a second that is diff erent from the fi rst (close to the 
fi rst, co-present or co-located), and takes the two as one, thus introducing 
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a relation between them. The correlatedness between the two becomes 
interpreted as an indexical sign. Worked out by conditioning, it represents an 
existing correlation. (See examples in Hawkins, Byrne 2015; on the aspect of 
co-localization, in Stjernfelt 2014: 67–68.)
(3) Picking a track between some “points” that are co-present. In addition to (2), 
it includes picking the movements from one to another. Th is is imitation. 
Tracking appears as the modelling of a form. Th e corresponding sign is emon 
(Kull 2018: 140–141). 
(4) Picking that is made on the basis of the form recognized, the form that is 
made as diff erent. Th is is instruction or making an independent other. Th is 
corresponds to symbolic relation. Indeed, symbolic operations assume the 
capacity for the construction of the opposite, the non-existent, the negation. 
Th is is a detached, un-grounded8 relationship. 
Th ese four types of choices, related to learning and the types of sign, can be seen 
as the major types of semiotic quanta. They are ordered in a row of growing 
complexity. A higher type includes all the lower ones. We could call them semiotic 
quanta because they are wholes, appearing in the subjective present, in one 
moment. Th us the lower types of semiosis are embedded in the higher type not 
sequentially but in the same subjective moment. Th e moment itself may have a 
longer duration in a more complex sign. Th e duration of nowness is obviously 
related to the freedom of choice, since in the case of a shorter duration of nowness 
both the number of options and the complexity of operations tend to be smaller. 
4. Concluding remarks
By considering choice as the central condition of semiotic models, we arrive at a 
very rich deductive repertoire for the derivation of a general semiotic theory. Th e 
assumption that semiosis requires choice justifi es the established defi nition of the 
sign and clarifi es the ontological diff erence between physical and semiotic models. 
It helps to understand the conditions for the emergence of subjectivity. 
Free choice is simpler than oft en assumed. Choice means picking an option in a 
situation of a plurality of options. Motivatedness, preference, strategy of decision – 
all these are not necessary for making a choice, while they all assume the existence 
8 On symbols as un-grounded signs, see, for instance, Rą czaszek-Leonardi, Joanna; Deacon, 
Terrence 2018. Th e symbol un-grounding problem in language acquisition. In: Deacon, 
Terrence; Hendlin, Yogi (eds.), Eighteenth Annual Biosemiotics Gathering Abstract Booklet. 
Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley. See also Cangelosi 2005. 
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of choosing. Th e simplicity of optionality implies that the existence of choice in 
organisms without a nervous system is feasible. 
Th us, on the one hand, choice-making can be very simple. On the other hand, 
however, as a necessary condition for semiosis, it both strengthens and specifi es 
the diff erence from computational processes of information. It also implies that 
semiosis cannot be found in any single receptor or a single process, because 
optionality means multiplicity. Semiosis and choice are collective phenomena, in 
the sense that they require a collective of habits.
In addition, it may occur that if free choice is understood as the fundamental 
feature of sign processes, then it allows for the unifi cation of the major semiotic 
models. As regards the Saussurean model, choice is the basis of arbitrariness. 
For the Greimasian model, choice is described by the axes of contrariness and 
contradiction, which represent options. According to Lotman’s model, the 
relationship of untranslatability is the situation of choice. In view of the Uexküllian 
model, choice is the decision of an action in umwelt. According to the Peircean 
model, interpretation includes choice as we have described above. An integrated 
semiotic theory is feasible.9 
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Свободный выбор и обучение: семиозис как процесс выбора
В статье рассматривается возможность смещения концепции выбора в центр семиоти-
ческой теории обучения. Знаковый процесс (смыслообразование) представлен через 
концепцию свободного выбора: семиозис определяется как процесс выбора между 
одновременно предоставленными альтернативами, а семиотическое обучение – как 
оставление выбором следов, слагающихся в память и влияющих на следующие выборы. 
Последующая модификация этих следов (или ограничений) называется привыканием. 
Органические потребности – это гомеостатические механизмы в сочетании с выбором. 
Потребности и привычки приводят к мотивациям и мотивированности выбора. 
Семиозис как выбор может рассматриваться как дополнительное описание триадической 
модели семиозиса, предложенной Пирсом, однако может соответствовать и моделям 
знакового процесса, разработанным в других школах семиотики. В статье предлагается 
проект совместной типологии семиозиса и обучения.
Vaba valik ja õppimine: semioos on valikuprotsess
Vaatleme võimalust nihutada valiku mõiste semiootilise õppimisteooria keskmesse. Niisiis, 
määratleme märgiprotsessi (ehk tähendusloomet) vaba valiku mehhanismi kaudu, Nimetame 
semioosiks valiku tegemise protsessi, milles valitavad võimalused on antud üheaegsetena 
olevikumomendis. Semiootiliseks õppimiseks nimetame valiku poolt jäetavaid jälgi, mis 
mõjustavad järgnevaid valikuid. Need jäljed moodustavad mälu. Nende jälgede (ehk 
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piirangute) edaspidine teisendamine on harjumine. Orgaanilised vajadused on homöostaatilised 
mehhanismid koos nendega seotud valimisprotsessidega. Vajadustest ja harjumustest tule-
neb tehtavate valikute motiveeritus. Semioosi kirjeldamist valikuprotsessina võib pidada 
komplementaarseks Peirce’i triaadse semioosimudeliga, kuid meie kirjelduse kaudu on seda 
lihtsam seostada teiste semiootikakoolkondade poolt arendatud märgiloome mudelitega. 
Esitame ka õppimist ja semioosi seostava tüpoloogia. 
